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Crisis Management in Thailand: The Ambivalence of “New” 
Keynesian Response* 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt** 
 
The glittering promises of globalization are turning to ashes all over 
the world…Countering this recession is likely to require a substantial 
dismantling of the neo-liberal edifice. (Brecher and Costello 2001) 
 
Without a capacity for monitoring and discerning where the most 
acute problems are, countries risk devoting scarce budgetary resources 
to safety net policy that is not targeted efficiently to those most in 
need in a specific crisis situation. (IMF deputy director Peter Heller cf 
Assavanond and Achayakachart 1999)  
 
Introduction 
In the wake of the 1997 socio-economic crisis in Thailand several new issues 
have entered the political agenda, which before the crisis were almost non-
existing or at least controversial in the public debate. Some issues came hand in 
hand with the bailout of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs); others 
entered the national polity through a number of new agenda setting movements 
and actors. The new items on the policy agenda are, among others, 
protectionism, and a U-turn away from export-orientation (EOI) towards the 
domestic market; a focus on social policies; and in general, a new populist and 
nationalist discourse. Furthermore, domestic and international criticism of the 
IMF and the Washington consensus has escalated in tandem with the unfolding 
of the financial crisis. In the words of an ‘insider’,  “All the IMF did was make 
East Asia´s recession deeper, longer, and harder” (Stiglitz 2000).1 
 
Western liberal observers describe the new policy in harsh terms. According to 
the New York Times, Thailand is still reeling economically nearly four years 
after the devaluation of the Bath, turning inward and away from export-led 
growth. The pro-Western prime minister Chuan Leekpai was replaced in 
January with the populist billionaire, Thaksin Shinawatra, who reversed 
economic policy by re-emphasizing domestic growth over exports, funneling 
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billions of dollar to banks and farmers and dismissing those, like the governor of 
the Thai central bank, with whom he was in disagreement (Landler, June 26, 
2001). Also the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) notes, what it 
euphemistically calls “The creep towards protectionism is gaining momentum in 
Thailand. On August 10, the Thai government passed controversial legislation 
limiting foreign ownership of Thai telecommunications companies to 25%. The 
previous cap was 49%. The market reacted negatively, dumping telecom shares 
across the board as foreign investors read the rollback as a signal that Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government is moving towards a more 
protectionist posture” (Crispin, November 1, 2001). Other recent indicators are 
that in the beginning of October 2001, the government said it would spend as 
much as B30 billion (US$673 million) this year to subsidize local farmers by 
buying commodities such as rice and rubber at above-market prices. The 
government plans to spend a record B1.02 trillion in the financial year starting 
October to spur domestic consumption. The Bank of Thailand said it has no 
immediate plans to lower interest rates, even as other Asian countries trimmed 
rates in line with the US Federal Reserve.  It is low enough to support growth. In 
addition the government decided to start a fund proposed by the previous 
administration and is trying to raise US$250 million from banks, International 
Finance Corporation, World Bank, and private investors for the purchase of 
local stocks (http://aric.adb.org/chronology.asp). All in all it seems that a deficit 
driven economic policy putting emphasis on the domestic market has replaced 
the past decades’ search for increasing exports.  
 
Whether the new policy orientation has any substance remains to be seen and as 
this paper intends to scrutinize the new nationalist social policy focus of the 
government in order to understand its real intend. The paper is divided into four 
parts. The first part explores recent changes in the global economy which have 
had an important impact on Thai policymakers’ room of maneuver. The second 
part explains why the ideology of neoliberal globalization has reached a 
stalemate and seems to be replaced by a new emphasis on state intervention in 
the economy. The third part explores in more detail why this also applies to the 
case of Thailand, and further discusses the domestic and international pressures 
and conditionalities on the so-called policy of  “new” Keynesianism. Finally, the 
paper rounds up by pointing to the need for further research into the political 
economy of social policy in Thailand.  
 
Goodbye globalization - hello localization 
The causes of the financial crisis that hit Thailand in July 1997 and later on 
spread to the rest of East Asia and Russia have now been well analyzed and 
documented (Schmidt 2000b; Li, Hersh and Schmidt 2001).2   It was essentially 
the turning point for the crisis of neoliberal globalization and the end of the day 
of the Washington Consensus. It is also wellknown that all parties involved 
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made a catastrophic misdiagnosis of the problem, one that resulted in Thailand 
getting insufficient treatment. This was done with the direct intervention of the 
US Treasury and the IMF which forced through an austerity plan including 
budget cuts and sky-high interest rates. In contrast to earlier financial crises, 
which were resolved by banks effectively paying a good share of the bill, it 
ended with a huge bailout of private international investors with public funds.3 
 
With no negotiation, the Thai government adopted the IMF-led bailout package 
($17.2 billion) to maintain the liquidity of its financial system. The largest 
source of funds came from Japan, reflecting the origin of Thailand’s FDI. The 
funds were almost exhausted after filling the balance-of-payment gap and 
rebuilding foreign reserves ($15 billion). The austerity program aimed to restore 
external balance, stem capital outflows, stabilize the Thai baht, and rebuild 
investors' confidence. The IMF also imposed many restrictions. For instance, 
new fiscal policies were required to have a balanced budget by increasing the 
consumption tax and reducing government spending through a10% salary cut for 
all public employees. Privatization of public enterprises was also part of the 
package (Chotigeat and Lin 2001). Millions of working poor in Thailand were 
expected to lose jobs in months ahead as the country and the rest of Southeast 
Asia suffered from the worst financial and economic crisis in decades. Half of 
the nation's wealth was concentrated in the hands of the richest 10 percent, and 
income disparity between rich and poor was one of five sharpest in the world 
(Mydans, December 15, 1997). 
 
Throughout 1997, the government closed down 64 financial companies, leaving 
27 and 13 local banks operating.4  A new bankruptcy law was introduced in 
1998, but in practice the law has not functioned well. The oversupply in real 
estate and the non performing loans in the financial sector had not been sorted 
out.  
 
In mid1998, the economy went into a selfreinforcing downward spiral and the 
government decided that the austerity program did not accomplish the intended 
result. With the green light from the IMF, it changed policy in favor of deficit 
spending in order to stimulate demand. Later in the beginning of 1999, the Thai 
government created a special spending package (130 billion baht) aimed at 
jump-starting the stalled economy. Again the loans were financed by Japan 
(Miyasawa Plan) and the World Bank. The package allocated 53 billion baht in 
new state spending to boost export competitiveness, to encourage domestic 
consumption, to purchase goods and services by local government, to create half 
a million new jobs, and to fund social welfare programs. In mid 1999, the third 
program attempted to cut producer costs, spur new investment, and help new 
homebuyers through 102 billion baht in new tax cuts and spending programs 
(Chotigeat and Lin 2001). In contrast, before the crisis, Thailand was running 
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such large budget surpluses “that it was actually starving the economy of much-
needed investments in education and infrastructure, both essential to growth” 
(Stiglitz 2000), now with the crisis it seems that a much needed more pro-active 
policy is supposed to be implemented. 
 
However, the economy has not improved. The year 2001 has been characterized 
by increasing unemployment, growing government debt, and non-performing 
loans. The recession has proved more sustained and harder to resolve, as present 
problems are different than when the crisis took off. In 1998, a booming US 
economy created a false hope that it could help pull the Thai economy out of 
recession, while in late 2001, the slumping US economy is a major problem for 
the strategic reliance and dependency on foreign markets. The September 11 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have made the storm more severe. 
An expected drop in foreign investment will also strain Asian economies 
(Schuman 2001). Yet US bankers and economists fear that Thailand and other 
East Asian countries, blaming the United States for their woes, will stall on 
reform. The once rosy picture of the ‘East Asian miracle’ painted by foreign 
investors and the IFIs has turned into a contradictory situation where either side 
blames each other for choosing the wrong long-term strategies and short term 
crisis management policies. 
 
Another difference between pre-crisis and post-crisis management is the 
increasing competitiveness of China, which is the country many economists 
believe will be the least affected by the US slowdown. As a matter of fact, 
roughly 75 percent of the increase in aggregate GDP among all low-income 
countries has occurred within China in the last 20 years, which poses a 
tremendous challenge to Southeast Asia.5 Foreign investment that once went to 
countries like Thailand is moving more and more to China. China is already 
drawing 60 per cent of the foreign direct investment made in Asia and this figure 
is expected to rise to 80 per cent after it has joined the WTO. According to 
Supachai Panitchpakdi, who will head the WTO next year: “China should be 
included in the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) so that the Southeast Asian 
regional grouping is not left behind when China joins the World Trade 
Organisation,” and “Members of Asean should also 'compensate' for China's 
entry by making inroads into the Chinese market before the rest of the world 
does so,” he said furthermore. “Chinese products are very competitive in the 
United States, we may have to compensate by having an early access into 
markets in China” (Supachai 2001). 
 
That external factors to a very significant degree are increasingly eroding the 
room of maneouvre of Thai economic policy-making and making the EOI 
strategy obsolete is illustrated by various reports which show that the global 
economy shrank last quarter for the first time in two decades. In the US, GDP 
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dropped by four-tenths of a percent in the second quarter, well before the 
September 11 attacks, and has continued to fall. 415,000 people lost their jobs in 
September. Growth in global trade fell from 13% in 2000 to 1% in 2001.    
Stunningly,  global  cross-border  investment  has  dropped by half. Economists´ 
 project declines in Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan. The 
unemployment rate in Japan is the highest since the end of WW II. Prices of 
natural resource commodities, on which developing countries depend, are off 
40%. It seems that “the riotous progress of economic globalization has gone into 
reverse” (Brecher and Costello 2001).  
 
The global recession is marked by overinvestment in services and industry, 
leading to overproduction, intense global competition, falling prices, 
plummeting profits, and consequent downsizings, layoffs, and bankruptcies. 
This process leads to a downward spiral of reduced consumer demand, and in 
the end might lead to falling government revenues, and public sector cutbacks. 
Deflation is occurring in Japan, and projected future price levels in the US are 
reflecting the same trend. "Today, inflation pressures are at their lowest levels in 
a generation because of the first synchronous global recession since 1973-75. 
Historically, such deflation has often resulted in a downward spiral, as investors 
stop investing and consumers stop buying in the expectation that prices will fall 
even lower. And the original policies of the IMF, designed to allow countries to 
correct currency imbalances without driving their economies into recession, 
have been replaced by near-universal requirements for ‘structural adjustment’ 
austerity. In the face of the current downturn, policymakers have cut interest 
rates and are beginning to forsake neo-liberal principles and promote 
government budget deficits to stimulate the economy” (Brecher and Costello 
2001). 
 
With a global economy in shackles, Thailand is essentially left with a choice 
between continuing the  ‘race-to-the-bottom’ strategy it has pursued since the 
mid 1980s or as we have seen at least in rethorics and in the election campaign 
from the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT), Thailand might embark on a different path 
of reforms in a ‘communitarian-third way’ direction trying to establish what is 
termed a ‘new social partnership’ between the state and agents from ‘civil 
society’. This strategy, which is worrying foreign investors and representatives 
of the ‘Washington Consensus’ involves a particular mixture of populism and 
nationalism denoting more emphasis on self-reliance and protection of Thai 
interests. It is simultaneously the result of and response to a social crisis to 
which there are no easy solutions. 
 
Interestingly, the crisis brought along a localist movement engaging various 
segments of Thai society into a participatory democratization process. Although 
this new trend is merged with and is blurred by a blend of new nationalism and 
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monarchism, it is seemingly an attempt to promote citizen participation and self-
rule, self-reliance and self-capacity at the local level (Connors 2001: 4). What 
are of interest here is the close relations between the new Thaksin government 
with its reformist program and the NGOs connected with the localist alternative 
movement. 
 
Some observers see this as the beginning of a new historic compromise and 
recomposition of the state. “... the legacy of the economic crisis in Thailand may 
have been to mainstream localism, not merely as an ideological cover for ultra-
nationalist reaction, but as an integral component of a new economic compact. 
Thaksin, both in words and deed, hints in this direction: ‘perhaps it is only half 
true that we are following a populist strategy .... But we have ignored the bottom 
half of the economy for a long time. Now we are coming back ....’”(Bangkok 
Post 30 January 2001 cf Connors 2001: 22). 
 
Whether these statements are a cover for receiving political support and 
legitimacy or reflect true concerns for the local struggle of emerging ‘civil 
society’ actors or whether the latter are simply being used and coopted by the 
new government and the World Bank is an open issue. However, it seems that 
the contours of a new economic and social policy, either as crisis management 
or in a longer perspective as a whole new political and economic strategy, are 
emerging out of the ashes of the crisis.6 
 
The new global Keynesianism or why big capitalists want a big state7 
Comparative political economists have developed different arguments regarding 
the determinants of social policies. One type of argument points to social 
welfare policies convergences due to an underlying logic of industrialism, and 
another sees them as state responses to the social requirements of capitalism. A 
third view approaches the problematique from quite another angle by suggesting 
that the survival of market-based capitalism is essentially based on a Keynesian 
strategy which saves it from self-destruction (Galbraith 1997: 5). The necessary 
prerequisite is a social compact between labor and capital. This type of 
argument is based on two readings of the Keynesian social welfare state. One 
sees it as a tool of compromise when the foundation of capitalism is at stake like 
during and after the crisis in of the 1930s and post WW II. The second reading 
regards the socio-economic dimension (i.e. the surplus absorption); by 
functioning as a demand primer, including social expenditures, Keynesian 
macroeconomics alleviates the tendency towards stagnation (Schmidt & Hersh 
2000: 8). 
 
This understanding is closely related to the important debate regarding the past 
and present of the way ties to the world economy, patterns of geopolitical and 
geoeconomic competition, and processes of transnational cultures, ideologies 
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and policy discourses have influenced social policies. The impact of the external 
determinants on economic and social policy agendas cannot stand alone, but 
should be pared with an understanding of the impact of domestic actors on states 
policymaking. 
 
These theoretical concerns make the recourse to history important - and broadly 
speaking, the neoliberal prescriptions on economic and social policies cannot be 
based on the past record. History provides no clear examples of laissez-faire 
policies which resulted in high wage economies capable of supporting widely 
dispersed welfare benefits for a large population. Essentially what has happened, 
also in the case of Thailand, is what Bienefeld (1993: 31) has called “the 
disarming of the state.” Financial deregulation is a route to an increasingly 
polarized society in which the majority will suffer sustained welfare losses and 
in which the goal of a more humane, caring and leisure-oriented society will 
soon be dismissed as utopia. 
 
In this regard the question which policymakers, social activists and academics 
face in view of globalization is whether the process will result in greater social 
welfare or whether globalization serves to reduce the social dimension of 
twentieth century capitalism. This problematique has gained special significance 
in the context of the breakdown of East Asian authoritarian capitalism. Will an 
evolution towards more democracy open the way to a greater contest over the 
economic surplus/social product? How will the political systems absorb the 
demands of the social classes at a time when adjustment to the conditionalities 
imposed by the IFIs go in the direction of the dismantling of the Thai-style 
developmental state?8 In order to give an appropriate answer to those questions 
it is intrinsically to analyze the interplay of internal and external forces and 
institutions disregarding which level determines the other as they are intertwined 
in various obvious ways. 
 
The increasing power of transnational corporations and the growth of 
supranational global governance institutions such as WTO, the World Bank, the 
IMF and not least NAFTA, APEC and the EU are playing an increasing role in 
liberalizing world trade - although the state managers have been part and parcel 
of this deregulation and privatization process, it has on the other hand also had 
the effect that national states are loosing power. “Consequently, Keynesianism, 
social planning, and the welfare state often have given way to monetarist 
policies, even under Social Democratic governments” (Olsen 1998: 351). 
 
It is in this context that after the Asian crisis, the Russian default of 1998 and the 
collapse of the US hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (later on saved 
by a government bailout!), the contagion effect of the global crisis, and the 
effects of the 11. September attacks, governments are preparing emergency 
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plans to remedy ‘market failures’. In the US, the UK and the rest of the EU 
government money is bailing out everything from airlines to insurance 
companies and medicine has been bought below market prices by the US in 
Germany - and “the pressure to return to 1970s-style interventionism will be 
great” (Preston 1 October, 2001: 32). Subsidies have again become the name of 
the game. After the fall of yet another utopian project - ‘the universal free 
marketplace’  - the image that all countries following the Western route to 
modernity or what some call globalization - has fallen into pieces. In reality, this 
image has been deformed by a market ideology that is far removed from any 
human reality... (Gray 24 September, 2001: 25). 
 
The basic question is whether the EOI model will be replaced by a new type of 
interventionist state. The new buzzwords in Thailand i.e. social partnership, a 
restructured state, and a new social compact denote a peculiar blend of 
‘communitarianism’ and a Blairist ‘Third Way’ neo-Keynesianism.9 
 
Keynes did believe in a 'mixed' partnership between state and private venture 
and that some basic functions of a nation's economy should remain a central and 
directly controlled concern of the state, which should be financed through 
taxation. Neo-Keynesians such as Stiglitz believe it is part of the state apparatus' 
responsibility to monitor and enact policies affecting both the internal and global 
dynamics of the political-economic environment. This is based on the 
recognition that a government's primary responsibility lies in its duty to its 
citizenry, and, where necessary, direct intervention in the economy may be 
requisite in discharging this responsibility. So, the neo-Keynesians see the role 
of the state in the economy as necessary. With the original Keynesian approach, 
the state can be seen as an active partner with private industry in the economic 
affairs and conditions within its own boundaries. Neo-Keynesians tend to see the 
state more as an overseer vis-a-vis social provision, rather than as the active 
partner (White 2001). 
 
Stiglitz's argument is a harsh critique of the IFIs ‘one-size-fits-all’ austerity 
approach as it puts stress on the necessity of variety in approach to each 
economic area's economic circumstances. This must take into account the area's 
(usually a state's) history and, crucially, its economic and social history (i.e. 
employment, taxation and redistribution, and social jurisdiction and traditions).  
 
The critique goes even further as it pinpoints the US administrations’ 
tremendous influence on the workings of the World Bank and the IMF. Stiglitz 
and other neo-Keynesianists note that institutional reforms must precede de-
regulation of an economy. We see the outlines of a different approach to that of 
the current IMF "packages" which all have privatization and marketization high 
on their agendas. However, any paradigm shift is likely to be slow - as serious 
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and step-by-step carefully considered institutional change is not congenial to 
IMF boardrooms which operate on the basis of ideology and blackboard 
economists' diagrams. This workstyle doesn’t pay due attention to the result of 
conclusions drawn from systematic study of a particular country's modern 
economic system and political experiences which, particularly in the case of the 
current Asian scene, seems to be urgently required (McFarlane 2001). 
 
This brings us to the current interesting, paradoxical position of the state as an 
entity in the global political economy. As we have already seen, the purported 
dominance of neoliberalism would appear to indicate that the state's role is little 
more than as a facilitator of private enterprise within its borders. “Yet, in the 
case of the US vis-a-vis global institutions, it appears that those who fear that 
elected politicians are losing economic control to faceless multi-national 
institutions, may be premature in their assessments, despite the situation (to 
paraphrase Orwell) that some states are more equal than others” (White 2001).  
 
What the Asian crisis subsequently revealed was that the speed of deregulation 
cannot be uniform. It must be adjusted to the special circumstances, politics and 
even culture of each country. The personality of a Central Bank governor might 
even be significant in determining the effectiveness of a deregulated financial 
system and the movement of free exchange rates (McFarlane 2001). What is 
really new in this context is the call from big business to encourage the state to 
intervene in the economy, and in a number of cases these calls have been 
extended to (re)nationalize ailing industries and credit institutions. Such 
proposals have been made by such varied actors and speculators as J.P. Morgan 
and various representatives from Thai productive capital, but has at the same 
time been opposed by representatives of both domestic and international 
financial capital. Even the liberal conservative magazine The Economist 
suggests that “....capitalism as it exists in the West, with safety-nets, public 
services and moderate redistribution bolted on’ is a way to have capitalism while 
not hurting the poor too much” (Cf Hewison 2001a: 10). 
 
The new nationalism, privatization and social policy in Thailand 
Although it is now clear that the major causes of the financial crisis were ill 
advised and non-sustainable demands of deregulation, privatization and 
liberalization, the neoliberal pundits have gained new air. At the recent WTO 
meeting in Doha in Qatar items such as health care, education and social policy 
were debated as suitable for privatization. Also the World Bank and the IMF 
have for two decades advocated commercialization of those potentially 
collective goods and market interests are lining up to invest in user-fees and 
corporate social welfare. However, it is first and foremost privatization and 
liberalization of public enterprises which is at stake for what some vested 
interests in Washington term the new nationalist and populist government of 
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Thailand which has committed itself on a social partnership with segments of 
the NGO sector and apparently postponed, footdragged or even opposed 
privatization pressures from the IFIs.  
 
The following briefly evaluates the background of privatization efforts of state 
enterprises, health care, education and social welfare policies in order to 
tentatively evaluate whether the new localism cum nationalism of the Thaksin 
government will provide a fundamental shift in policy focus or whether it is new 
wine in old bottles! 
 
Privatization happens for three reasons: 1. the end of political ideological 
conflict between capitalism and socialism; 2. the completed status of welfare 
state policy and 3. the governments' need for money to support their budget 
deficits. For developing countries such as Thailand, the government's need of 
money to reduce its current account deficit is a reason for privatization, but that 
is not the main reason. The real blessing comes from getting rid of inefficiencies 
in the SEO services. The reasons and types of privatization of each enterprise 
might not be the same. "Some enterprises are not profit-making firms, but they 
must exist for welfare or for security reasons... The government should find 
ways for SOEs to be more efficient and to be productive" (Pouaree 1997). 
 
Privatization has had an interesting history in Thailand when taking into 
consideration that it is widely believed that income inequality increased 
significantly during the 1990s as a result of a boom in asset prices and the 
various privatization and deregulation measures adopted by the governments 
(Ramesh 2000: 22-3). This makes it even more difficult to understand the 
reaction of the Chuan government after the crisis that obviously favored the 
increase of private participation in the public service. 
 
In the Washington Post, Sandra Sugawara reported from Bangkok: “Hordes of 
foreign investors are flowing back into Thailand, boosting room rates at top 
Bangkok hotels despite the recession. Foreign investors have gone on a $6.7 
billion shopping spree this year, snapping up bargain-basement steel mills, 
securities companies, supermarket chains, and other assets. A few pages behind 
stories about layoffs and bankruptcies are large help-wanted ads run by 
multinational companies. General Electric Capital Corp., which increased its 
stake in Thailand this year through three major investments in financing and 
credit card companies, is seeking hundreds of experts in finance and accounting, 
according to one ad. General Motors Corp. is recruiting aggressively for its 
massive new Thai car assembly plant, scheduled to open in two years” 
(Sugawara November 28, 1998). 
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Nicholas Kristof expanded on this theme in the New York Times: "’This is a 
crisis, but it is also a tremendous opportunity for the US’....’This strengthens the 
position of American companies in Asia.’ A clear indication that the Asian crisis 
would further the American agenda came in December, when 102 nations 
agreed to open their financial markets to foreign companies beginning in 1999. 
It is unclear how the pact will be carried out, but it marks an important victory 
for the US, which excels in banking, insurance and securities. Fundamentally 
that agreement and other changes are coming about because Asian countries, 
their economies gasping, are now less single-minded in their concern about 
maintaining control. Desperate for cash, they are less able to pick and choose, 
less able to withstand American or monetary fund demands that they open up” 
(Kristof, February 1,1999). 
 
As mentioned above, under pressure from the IMF, the Thai government was 
forced to scrap a regulation that limited foreign corporations to a 25 percent 
stake in Thai financial companies. Citibank signed a memorandum of 
understanding on the purchase of a major Thai bank - First Bangkok City Bank. 
As a matter of fact, “the crisis resulted in a massive restructuring of ownership 
and control in the economy. Devaluation meant the end of many businesses, 
with hundreds closing in all sectors. This saw a transfer of ownership to 
Japanese, American and European investors through debt-for-equity swaps, 
investment in devalued companies, and buy-outs of Thai partners”, but “as the 
government took over four struggling banks and closed many finance 
companies, one-third of the financial sector’s companies were gone by the end 
of 1998." “At the end of 1999, the total state investment in the banks alone was 
US$ 12 billion or about 10 percent of GDP .... The bailout of the financial sector 
means that every taxpayer will be footing the bill for at least a generation” 
(Hewison 2001d: 9,10 & 13). 
 
Turning to the issue of privatization of state enterprises, the Thaksin government 
had originally pledged to raise the market capitalization of the moribund Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) by about 700 billion baht by listing 14 state 
companies in the next two years. Profitable monopolies such as the Telephone 
Organisation of Thailand (TOT) and the Communications Authority of Thailand 
(CAT) were due to be sold in 2002. 
 
In October 2000, the State Enterprise Corporatisation Policy Committee ordered 
the TOT and CAT to complete privatization within 120 days. In 2001, the task 
remained undone. And at the Airports Authority of Thailand, the threat of strikes 
by workers stalled the program. Privatization entered the policy agenda after the 
financial crisis struck in 1997, and the IMF demanded that the government 
divest its stake in the biggest state-owned financial institution, Krung Thai 
Bank, and other banks, as part of its loan package. “The Chuan Leekpai 
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government agreed, but buyers were put off by Krung Thai's high non-
performing loans. The latest is that Krung Thai could be privatized in the second 
quarter of next year. The divestiture of the government's stake in Thai Airways, 
originally slated for the end of 2001, has also been postponed till 2002, 
following a troubled year for the flag carrier” (FEER, November 27, 2001). 
 
During boom times before the crisis, the SET was worth 3.5 trillion baht, but its 
capitalization has since been eroded to less than half that figure reflecting the 
onslaught of whole sectors and companies. Many Thais fear losing control over 
domestic business if foreign capital gets to much influence 
(http://business-times.asia1.com.sg/views/story/0,2276,28895,00.html?). 
 
As a reaction to the changing popular sentiments the foreign-investment cap 
introduced in late 2001 look to be more exclusive. "Generally speaking, the new 
law means fewer companies will be able to enter the Thai market," says Somkiat 
Tangkitvanich from TDRI. "Incumbents who can hold shares without a strategic 
partner stand to benefit most," he adds. It is still unclear how the new law will 
finally be interpreted, but the cap sends an unmistakable signal. "Foreign 
investors have other places they can put their money," says Kosol Petchsuwan, 
president of the Telecoms Association of Thailand. "Unfortunately these new 
barriers could start a worrisome chain reaction" (cf Schuman 2001). 
 
The topmost bureaucrat in Thailand's finance ministry, Somchainuk Engtrakul, 
recently claimed that  ”the government needed money from the sale of state-
owned companies because tax collections were not enough to finance the budget 
deficit (FEER, November, 27 2001). This statement reflects the ongoing bitter 
struggle between international market oriented technocrats and nationalist 
oriented bureaucrats in the state apparatus. The Thai government has shown 
reluctance to sell its 'state jewels' in a bid to repay the government's massive 
foreign debt of 2.89 trillion baht (S$11 billion), which amounts to 56 per cent of 
Thailand's GDP. 
 
According to FEER citing Jayasankar Shivakumar, outgoing country director of 
the World Bank in Thailand the status quo is risky to Thailand's future economic 
health. "If power is not competitive, then the country will not be competitive. If 
the aim is to reduce tariffs, improve efficiencies and alleviate government debts, 
then there really is no other option than privatization" (Crispin  2001). Again 
illustrating the interests of foreign investors and neoliberal ideology, FEER 
notes that, privatization of Thailand's rigid state enterprises were always going 
to be a tricky business, requiring hard-nosed political choices. And with the 
economy slipping again, those choices have become ever more urgent. 
Unfortunately, the efforts so far resemble ‘business as usual’ (Crispin  2001). 
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The current debate on privatization is encapsulated by a noticeable shift in 
government strategy, and can be interpreted as being based on both nationalism 
and populism. As such its focus on the local is a conscious and oppotitional 
response to neoliberal globalization. As Hewison notes, “the nationalism of the 
localists is politically conservative, while the localist vision is a romantic 
construction of an imagined past.” They furthermore “... reject industrialization 
as a development strategy, seeing industry as a cause of exploitation and of the 
degradation of the environment” (2001c: 13 &15). At least in a short-term 
perspective it seems that, the new economic policy will be based on a more 
regulatory role for the state. 
 
Turning now to social policy and the role of the health sector, the past two 
decades, have seen powerful international trends in market-oriented health 
sector reforms being swept around the world, especially from the North to the 
South. Introduction of user fees for public services has become entrenched in 
many developing countries since publication of the World Bank policy 
document of 1987. Since then, the World Bank strategy has been powerfully 
reinforced by the practice of making user fees a condition of loans and aid from 
the IFIs (Whitehead, Dahigren and Evans 2001). 
 
The privatization policies of the IFIs for instance in health care is highly 
regressive, because pooling of risk is reduced and care costs fall more directly 
on the sick (who are most likely to poor, children or elderly) than on healthy 
individuals and the result is a medical poverty trap consisting of “Rises of out-
of-pocket costs for public and private health-care services are driving many 
families into poverty” (Whitehead, Dahigren and Evans 2001). 
 
Although there are government-funded insurance policies for civil servants in 
Thailand out-of-pocket expenses continue to be the primary source of funding 
for health services, accounting for 65.4 percent of the funding. The private 
sector continues to dominate the health sector by its stake of 67 percent of total 
health expenditures which is equal to 4.1 percent of GDP (government 
components are 33 percent of total and 1.9 of GDP). Private hospitals are 
growing at an estimated rate of about 12-15 percent each year and may soon 
become the major provider (Ramesh 2000: 101). 
 
In Thailand, poor people pay proportionally more for health care than rich 
people do. Although the number varies according to statistics and sources, and 
the dubious fact that the World Bank has changed its definition of poor, the 
Bank’s own figure is more than seven million people are below the poverty line 
of US$ 1.50 per day (Hewison 2001b: 14). The IFI´s and ADB’s directive to 
privatize health care is opposed by representatives of Thailand’s huge HIV-aids 
infected community, as an estimated 800,000 of whom survive with state 
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medical aid. Recently several hundred Aids patients joined protests at the ADB 
meeting in Chiang Mai, forming a so-called ‘living cemetery’ to bring public 
attention to their plight (Z-Net). To put those numbers into perspective, Thai 
society is full of contrasts and contradictions. In Bangkok, the number of non-
Thais checking in for treatment at the leading private hospital, Bumrungrad, has 
increased fourfold since 1996. This year, the figure will top 170,000. And 
Malaysian and Thai hospital operators want even more (Cheng 2001). In fact, 
there is evidence that user charges promote inequity by discouraging the poor, 
but not the well-off from seeking health care and to make matters even worse 
“combining insurance financing with private provision is one of the surest ways 
to escalating costs” (WHO 1993 cf Ramesh 2000: 84 and 101). 
  
It is not clear whether the Thaksin government wants to continue the 
privatization drive or make health a collective good. What is clear though is that 
there is an increasing demand for better and cheaper health services. Currently, 
Thailand's health systems are facing a financial crisis, demographic and 
epidemiological transition, and an increasing demand for more and costlier 
services which marks the urgency of a health reform in the nearest future. 
 
Turning to the contested role of education which still belongs under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) whose latest round took place in 
February 2000 it is welknown that the US and Canadian administrations want to 
privatize university education and adult training. As mentioned above, the 
beginning of the 1980s saw the launching of a massive strategy on the part of 
the IFIs to pressurize the developing countries and to force them to drastically 
cut state spending on health, welfare and education. Paradoxically, the World 
Bank recently came to the conclusion that educational levels in the Third World 
had reached mediocre levels, but concluded “that those countries which are 
willing to adopt legislative and regulatory frameworks for higher education ... in 
which the private sector has a greater involvement in teaching and finance, will 
continue to receive priority (World Bank 1995 cf Kalaftidès). 
 
In 1996, the Thai government began to offer various tax incentives and loans at 
low interest rates to encourage the establishment new private schools; likewise 
the government has been encouraging foreign universities to set up branch 
campuses in Thailand. This was in response to the demands of the private sector  
“but even with the rapid gearing up of secondary education, by the year 2000 
over 70 percent of the workforce would still have no more than six years of 
primary education” (Phongpaicit and Baker 1998: 149). 
 
This is also why the World Bank advertises that the investment outlook for 
private education in Thailand is very good. According to the World Bank, “there 
is a vigorous private education sector, which has already made significant 
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inroads into the education market, and which is poised for further expansion, 
particularly in the vocational area. Private pre-primary schools account for about 
20% of children enrolled, while about 12% of primary schools are privately 
operated. The private sector accounts for about 6% of the total number of lower 
secondary, and 23% of upper secondary schools. Moreover, nearly 50% of 
students are in private education at the vocational level, and significant numbers 
are also in higher academic education. The Thai government is already seeking 
foreign loans to support public education. Allowing foreign investment in 
private education to continue and to increase, but on more favorable terms to the 
international suppliers, is an increasingly probable development. There are 
examples of private, for-profit, companies that have already succeeded in 
obtaining licenses to operate universities and colleges, and it is interesting to 
take notice of Thailand’s recent relaxation of some of the rules for education 
investment. Private education institutions are now permitted to have tax 
exemption of their operational profit and the owners of a private university are 
entitled to retain for themselves 15% of income. Moreover, once an institution 
has obtained a license to establish a higher education unit, it is allowed freedom 
in organization and management” (http://www1.worldbank.org/edinvest). There 
is no doubt that in recent years the trend towards privatization of education has 
increased, particularly in higher education (Ramesh 2000: chp.5), which is 
awkward when taking into consideration that the public educational system 
historically and contemporarily has been considered by “the ruling class as an 
instrument for promoting national integration and for propagating the subject’s 
morality and virtues” (Bechstedt 1991: 303). 
 
Marketization of education threatens to excerbate not only the disparities 
between schools in terms of educational outcomes but also the existing social 
inequalities (Ramesh 2000: 143). The privatization drive and its concomitant 
passenger growing unevenness and inequality have been part and parcel of most 
governments policies in Thailand in recent times. This is also why it is important 
to stress that there are no signs whatsoever that the new Thaksin government 
wants to reverse these trends as the number of public enterprises privatized 
including education have been steadily increasing. 
 
The question about social protection has for a decade or so been debated in the 
Thai political context. This endeavor has been an achievement of the labor 
movement, which although weak on paper has managed to pressurize the 
authorities on this important issue. In connection with this trend, the 
international pressure and the present period of democratic opening has brought 
about an embryonic demise of the legitimacy of state-sponsored and employer-
dominated labor unions with a re-emergence of independent, representative 
organizations characterized by growing militancy (Lambert and Caspersz 1995: 
572/580/583). This is also the result of the activities of several international 
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organizations such as the AAFLI, ICFTU, and ILO who for years have lobbied 
Western countries to impose trade sanctions in retaliation for the general 
disbanding of unions and ban on strikes and other government induced industrial 
actions. There is no doubt that labor welfare campaigns and common strategies 
aimed at the establishment of social security systems and other solidarity 
measures have been increasing, not only in Thailand, but throughout the 
Southeast Asian region (Brown and Frenkel 1995: 82-106). 
 
The militancy has also been directed against the contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies of the IFIs which induce recessionary pressures, corporate 
closures, lower or negative growth rates, retrenchments and higher 
unemployment. Cutbacks in government expenditure lead to reduced spending 
on education, health and other services. The switch in financing and provision of 
services from a grant basis to user-pay basis impacts negatively on the poorer 
sections of society.  The removal or reduction of government subsidies jacks up 
the cost of living including the cost of transport, food, and fuel.  These and other 
policies have contributed to higher poverty, unemployment, income loss and 
reduced access to essential goods and services.  It is not a coincidence that 
countries undergoing IMF conditionality have been affected by demonstrations 
and riots (popularly called "IMF Riots"). The social impact of IMF policies is 
another major cause of the crisis of credibility in IMF conditionality (Khor 
2001). 
 
After the crisis and on the initiative of the ILO a tripartite mechanism was 
established; however it soon turned out that at the root of what may be described 
as a weak basis for tripartism is the continued constraints on freedom of 
association. In fact, the credibility of the officially sanctioned and legally 
recognized national trade union center is very much eroded now and workers 
with grievances, including members of the official unions, are increasingly 
looking elsewhere for representation. Since recent initiatives to develop 
independent and democratic trade unions have been constrained by government 
repression, workers’ organizations are forced to operate beyond the ambit of the 
law, and often clandestinely, are generally unable to effectively and openly 
criticize government policies and programs (ILO 1998 cf Schmidt 2002). 
Although labor comparatively speaking is weak and not very well organized it 
was nevertheless a major force behind the enactment of the Social Security Act 
in 1990. 
 
Evidence shows that because of the very low state schemes for improving the 
income and welfare of employees to catch up with inflation, Thai workers' 
demands initially concentrated on wage increases. But this pattern has been 
changing. This is clear from the fact that “major issues of labor disputes from 
1987 to 1989 concerned welfare (33 per cent) wages (20 per cent) conditions of 
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employment (18 per cent) and other issues (29 per cent)" (Piriyarangsan and 
Poonpanich 1994: 241).  The struggle to obtain social security protection in 
Thailand dates back to the 1950s, but in the late 1980s renewed pressure through 
public demonstrations and campaigns from the Labor Congress and Trade Union 
Congress resulted in the promulgation of the Social Security Act of 1990 
(Brown and Frenkel 1995: 104). The first phase was implemented in 1992 and 
covers health insurance, maternity benefit, disability benefit and death benefit. 
The scheme is financed by employers, employees and the government each 
paying 1.5 percent of wages as contributions, but there is serious debate about 
the second phase (Asher 1995: 16).  
 
On several occasions the IMF has interfered in the Thai domestic debate with 
regard to social policy by either directly or indirectly threatening officials and 
government representatives. For instance, in 1998 the Labour and Social 
Welfare Ministry planned to expand protection for retirees and dependents 
(children of retirees) by proclaiming publicly that this part of the population 
represents basic social welfare deserving state support. According to the IMF 
such a move would be in conflict with international practices and could become 
a costly burden in the future and “...that protecting retirees and children should 
be left to the private savings scheme and was outside the responsibility of the 
government According to various sources at least six million households would 
qualify for state assistance, either through the fund or from other government 
run programmes” (Sirithaveeporn 1998).  Already in August 1997 one month 
after the crisis hit the country, the government tried to avoid contributing to the 
Social Security Act which requires employees and employers each to contribute 
1.5 percent of monthly wages of employees to the Social Security Fund. “Thai 
Trade Union Congress secretary-general Pratueng Saensang said the government 
has an obligation to contribute to the social security fund. But it failed to make 
the seven-billion-baht contribution in April, citing economic and financial 
difficulties”. This violated the rights of workers, and the TTUC threatened to sue 
the Social Security Office, but representatives of the government left the 
question to the tripartite committee to decide (Unarat 1997). 
 
The policy of the IFIs has been to promote the establishment of adjustment-
related temporary social safety nets known as Social Funds (SFs). “The aim has 
been to offset the negative social impact of policy reform. SFs are increasingly 
conceived as an intermediate and long-term delivery instrument which is more 
efficient than traditional means of service delivery through established 
ministries, through their employment of an ostensibly more participatory, 
decentralized, and ‘demand-responsive’ approach. In this connection they have 
been seen as everything from a ‘beachhead’ for the modernization of the state 
(through the ‘demonstration effect’ they have on ineffectual state bureaucracies) 
to a ‘training ground in the democratic process’” (Cornia and Reddy 2001: 11). 
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Various components of the World Banks Social Investment packages have 
contributed to Thai NGOs and ‘civil society’ actors, as well as also provided 
assistance to the poor to cover health and education expenditures. 
 
An editorial from the leading newspaper Matichon said that the Chuan 
government risked losing support if its focus didn’t change from the financial 
sector to the poor and underprivileged and that the trickle-down policy had not 
improved the livelihoods of the ordinary people and that more power should be 
transferred to the Social Policy Committee (Matichon cf Bangkok Post August 
27, 1997). 
 
In the days and months leading up to the election, the debate in Thai newspapers 
referred to a breakdown in social policy; one common theme was a tendency to 
reduce complex social problems to, for instance, “family breakdown” as a code 
for bad society which only a government with “values” could fix. One politician 
suggested that “We believe that with a warm and healthy family, every social 
problem - drugs, street children, child exploitation, and prostitutes will be 
solved” (Assavanonda 2000). 
 
The official view of the Thai government is to boost the capabilities of families 
and communities in order to help them achieve greater self-reliance and to 
support individual development which is very much in compliance with the new 
Thaksin government’s goal of enhancing social partnership. Whether the goal is 
to attain equity or not is still to early to judge, but social welfare policies have so 
far been based on neoliberal thinking while economic policy has changed into a 
more nationalistic and protectionist direction. The emphasis is laid on self-
reliance, family and community mutual care, voluntary charity, and 
philanthropic initiatives and this is where the alliance between NGOs and the 
new government makes sense in a country where in the aftermath of the crisis 
there has been a transfer of wealth from the poor to the already rich. 
 
The new Thaksin government is squeezed between the demands and 
conditionalities of the IFIs, and an increasingly vocal popular protest movement 
against foreign influence. This situation is illustrated by the fact that according 
to the World Bank,10 the social impact of the crisis has been that 1) labor 
markets have worked well to cushion the effects of the crisis, but as Hewison 
notes when translated it means “that markets worked in spreading out the impact 
more evenly among workers. That is people were able to be laid-off easily. 
Because there was only a minimal social security system laid-off workers then 
went in search of other jobs. While they did this, family savings supported them. 
Family savings were depleted in this process. This implicated most heavily on 
the already poor;” 2) the World Bank recommends that social safety net 
expenditures be reduced by more than 16 percent. “Part of the reason for 
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recommending reduced expenditures was the view that, based on 1994 data, the 
Bank argued that only about 6 percent of government expenditure benefited the 
poor, while 25 percent concentrated on the rich.”  3) Again according to the 
Bank, the poor used their discretionary resources and savings on health and 
education, which means that “as the wealthy's ‘discretionary’ expenditures were 
more substantial, the impact on their wealth was relatively less;” 4) Finally, the 
Bank acknowledged that ‘traditional mechanisms’ of community-based support 
have broken down, and in contrast to its conclusion mentioned above, it 
recommended an increase in unionization. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Although it is to early to review or evaluate the Thaksin Shinawatra 
government’s virtues there is no doubt that it has become symbol of a nationalist 
backlash against IMF conditionalities and forced deregulation and privatization.  
During the election campaign Thaksin and the TRT devoted much concern for 
the plights of the poor and a harsch critique of Chuan Leekpai and the 
Democrats’ giving in to neoliberal demands from the IFI´s - the claim was being 
made that they had sold the country to foreigners and devastated domestic 
business. With regard to the question of privatization it is not yet clear whether 
the resistance made by the Thaksin government against demands from the IMF 
and World Bank is based on a genuine policy shift or on protection of domestic 
vested interests. “TRT may be expected to slow liberalisation in some areas. The 
party may rollback some changes to laws, and to give an ‘edge’ back to 
domestic business. That Thaksin is populist is an advantage as the pacification 
of the class struggle through a credit-sustained boom has been demonstrated in 
Thailand, and the threat of unrest of the kind seen in Indonesia is a worry for 
business” (Hewison 2001d: 18). Thai businessmen have taken key positions in 
the cabinet. Dej Boonlong, the Labor Minister, is a wealthy businessman and 
president of Thai Teijin Textile and Thai Textile, which recently laid off a 
substantial number of workers. Telecom tycoon Adisai Potaramik is now 
commerce minister. This media magnate Pracha Maleenond has been given the 
post of deputy communications minister and Suriya Juengrungraunkig, one of 
the country's biggest auto parts dealers, was appointed industry minister. These 
appointments make the situation even more fluid than expected during the 
election campaign. 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis which hit Southeast and East Asia in late 
summer 1997 there was suddenly much talk in the media about the need for 
social policies and even the IFIs urged the governments in the region to establish 
social welfare states of a kind. Obviously they feared instability and that grave 
political and social consequences, in a worst case scenario, would set foreign 
investment in jeopardy and this would spell the end of the EOI growth model. 
What was at stake was the growth model without social welfare of the 
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‘Washington Consensus’ and suddenly the same proponents of neo-classical and 
neo-liberal development strategies saw themselves in the awkward and 
contradictory situation arguing for the opposite of two decades doctrinaire 
economic policy recommendations. This U-turn in IFI conditionality had a 
notable impact on the Thai debate with regard to economic and social policy. 
 
Both left and right political discourses in Thai have relied on the idea that, ‘civil 
society’ can replace the role of the state. The basic argument in this paper is that 
‘civil society’ at least in its mainstream understanding cannot replace the state, 
but should make a greater effort into pressurizing the state to take up basic 
responsibilities and enhance developmental and regulatory state capacities in 
accordance with its level of development. “There is great danger that the current 
overemphasis on ‘civil society’ detracts or hijacks the focus away from what is 
of immediate importance in any country with high levels of poverty, inequality 
and social crisis.  If ‘civil society’ includes social groupings and strata like 
organized labor and the peasantry it makes sense as recent examples have shown 
that the labor movement has been relatively successful in pushing for the Social 
Security Act despite resistance from the entrenched business politico-business 
alliance” (Schmidt 2002).  
 
Against this background it is important to note that social safety nets cannot, 
realistically, be constructed in a short time perspective. Similarly, measures such 
as attempts to save viable enterprises and active labor market policies can 
achieve only limited results when they go against the grain of macroeconomic 
conditions, and mixed signals from the international realm. With a weak ‘civil 
society’ and a non-responsive state which “cannot cope with demands, due to 
lack of resources or loopholes in the welfare system, there will be widespread 
social problems, discontent, and instability” (Chan 2001: 31). Furthermore the 
scope of social policy is extremely limited since the focus of the IFIs is to 
promote limited, individualized and temporary social safety nets; thus the 
current focus on poverty programs per se distracts attention from its two main 
dimensions: employment and income policies and other social programs besides 
health, education and social welfare, such as pensions, housing and subsidies to 
basic consumption; finally, as a consequence redistribution of land, income and 
resources disappear from the intellectual and political agenda. In this context the 
current move by the IFIs can be interpreted as a conscious way to promote 
ideological hegemony by distracting the real issues from the domestic and 
international policy and social agenda. 
 
Related to this discussion, the Thai scholar and activist Ungpakorn argues, that 
the Thai working class has been, and continues to be, an agent for social and 
political change (Husan 2001). According to him the aim of the NGOs is “to 
channel worker discontent away from strikes and into constitutional channels to 
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press for social reforms. Rather contradictorily, the NGOs supported the 1997 
constitution that barred all those not having a university degree from standing in 
parliament.” The NGOs are advocating a ‘left nationalist’ politics seeking to 
side with domestic capitalists against foreign capital. The NGOs concentrate on 
trade union leaders rather than the rank and file with the aim of setting up 
national tripartite institutions. ”Such a plan, however, finds resistance from trade 
union activists who oppose the strikingly termed ‘stinking water trade union 
leaders’ (named after the famed back street sewage drainage in Bangkok) of 
which there are three types: gangsters, stooges of the security services, and fat 
cat bureaucrats. This might help explain why the union density level is only a 
little over three per cent but, Ungpakorn argues, their baleful influence is offset 
by thriving networks of unofficial activists in ‘area groups’ and ‘coordinating 
committees’”(Husan 2001). 
 
Globally, flexibility has become the buzzword for dismantling of the welfare 
state, even of the sort of hybrid welfare state in Thailand, but this issue is 
seemingly being contested from below by demands for democratization and 
social reforms. The debate about social policy in Thailand has so far been 
dominated by those who believe in neoliberal ideology, which essentially is a 
matter of identifying needs, solve problems and create opportunities at the 
individual level. ”The causes behind the needs for support are believed to rest 
overwhelmingly in individuals and subcultural defects and dispositions. 
Responsibility is deflected from states and national economic, administrative 
and legal organisations to individuals and groups. Little attention is paid to the 
interacting consequences of economic and social change for families, 
employment, taxation, housing, social security and public services” (Schmidt 
2000a: 166). 
 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the institutional apparatus through 
which dialogue on the consequences of the crisis of social and economic 
adjustment could occur is absent. Evidence shows that the examples of 
cooperative labor-management relations are “(i) likely to be in the minority, and 
(ii) slower to diffuse in the absence of a well-developed trade union movement” 
(ILO 1998 cf Schmidt 2002).  
 
Given this background it would be wrong to describe the current policy as either 
new or old Keynesianism. It is rather a short term temporary pro-active policy to 
ride the storm and to avoid turmoil. A new type of import-substitution is 
probably emerging, but it can easily survive side by side with the emphasis on 
exports. One consequence common to both the privatization drive of state 
enterprises and all three social policy sectors is “the increasing role of the 
private sector in the provision and/or financing of social programmes. Provision 
by non-state actors is portrayed as being more efficient and even moral, whereas 
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provision by bureacratic organisations is described as expensive and fostering 
welfare dependency (Ramesh 2000: 181).  
 
As a post festum it is indeed necessary to stress the need for more policy 
research to assess the validity of assumptions that underly market-oriented 
reforms, and the options for, and constraints on, development of efficient and 
equitable public health, education and social policy sectors. Furthermore, there 
is daring need for more research into the deep rooted causes of poverty and 
inequality which in most cases can be removed only by structural interventions 
such as land and other types of redistribution, educational expansion and 
reforms of state institutions and credit systems. 
                                                          
1 The consensus between IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department is based on 
the ideological proposition that the key to success in developing countries are three things: 
macro stability, liberalization (lowering tariff barriers and market deregulation) and 
privatization. 
2 This paper regards globalization as a neoliberal ideology, but also as a concrete challenge 
and threat, creating winners and losers in the international economy. The impact of 
globalization on Thailand, and the actual cause of the crisis, occurred through a number of 
phases: through foreign investments, pressure from multilateral institutions to open up 
different sectors particularly the finance and the banking system and through currency 
speculation, unregulated short-term capital flows, particularly unregulated portfolio 
investments from hedge funds and pressures on the exchange rate from the revaluation of the 
Yen and the devaluation of the Renminbi which furthermore affect the room of manoeuvre for 
the execution of economic policy. Thus weak supervision of banks and poor state regulation 
of domestic private financial sectors were the results of yearlong pressures from the IMF, the 
World Bank, unaccountable international rating bureaus like Moody's Investor Service who 
review emerging economies credit ratings, and emerging domestic business segments always 
in search for easy short-term capital for speculative purposes without any developmental or 
domestic considerations. The genesis of the crisis lay in the way the country opened its doors 
to foreign capital. Thailand liberalized by allowing domestic investors access to cheap 
offshore funds through the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), launched in 1992. 
But it made the mistake of keeping the baht pegged to the US dollar. With no concern about 
currency devaluation, freewheeling Thai speculators borrowed freely and imprudently, 
without hedging.  Actually the crisis was an effect of underregulation rather than of 
overregulation as the spokesmen of globalization claim (Schmidt 2002).  
3 See the informative series of articles by Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn in New 
York Times February 1 and 17, 1999. 
4 In early 1998, the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) and Asset Management 
Corporation (AMC) were created to handle the assets of the now defunct financial companies. 
Since December 1997, more than 2/3 of the financial companies and two banks were seized 
with a book value of 384 billion baht in assets in the form of loans, real estate, office 
equipment, automobiles, etc. By December 1998, the FRA was able to sell only 1/3 of the 
total available lots (15 out of 45 or 41% of the value) represented by an average bid of 37 % 
of book value. The process was very slow and many assets were short of official documents 
(Chotigeat and Lin 2001).  
5 See the interview with Joseph Stiglitz in Multinational Monitor, April 2000. 
6 See also the interesting discussions of reforming Thai politics in McCargo (forthcoming). 
7 The following three paragraphs build on (Schmidt 2001; Schmidt and Hersh 2001). 
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8 In a recent report UNRISD (2000: 2-6) sets out four ways how globalization impacts and 
affects national-level social policy in the North: 1) It sets welfare states in competition with 
each other; 2) raises issues of social redistribution, social regulation and social empowerment 
to a regional and global level; 3) it generates a global discourse within and among global 
actors on the future of national and supranational social policy; and 4) finally it creates a 
global market in welfare providers. While in the South it has: 1) Generated severe 
indebtedness; 2) threatened assets and standards; 3) segmented social policy; 4) created zones 
of exclusion. 
9 Referring here to the peculiar blend of the post-Thatcher government in England where 
Tony Blair and Anthony Giddens launched a new social contract based on the ‘Third Way’ as 
a mixture between liberal economics and governance with a human face. 
10 The following is based on Hewison (2001b: 17-18). 
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